Abstract
Instead of traditional principal-agent conflicts espoused in most research dealing with developed economies, principal-principal conflicts have been identified as a major concern of corporate governance in emerging economies. Principal-principal conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders result from concentrated ownership, extensive family ownership and control, business group structures, and weak legal protection of minority shareholders. Such principal-principal conflicts alter the dynamics of the corporate governance process and, in turn, require remedies different from those that deal with principal-agent conflicts. This article reviews and synthesizes recent research from strategy, finance, and economics on principal-principal conflicts with an emphasis on their institutional antecedents and organizational consequences. The resulting integration provides a foundation upon which future research can continue to build.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 196-220 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Journal of Management Studies |
Volume | 45 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jan 2008 |
Scopus Subject Areas
- Business and International Management
- Strategy and Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation