@article{c47569d8b4b8465c9203f9cb0e556cda,
title = "Career Concerns, Beijing Style",
abstract = "The China model is increasingly viewed by developing countries as a viable alternative to democracy. China's allegedly merit-based promotion system is lauded as a secret ingredient of the China model. However, once being promoted to the top, Chinese leaders are as unconstrained as other autocrats. If there are fundamental reasons why other autocrats cannot commit to such a promotion system, why are Chinese leaders any different? We provide a unified theory that accommodates both China and other autocracies by postulating that they coordinate on different equilibria. Both the presence and the absence of political career concerns can arise in equilibrium.",
author = "Jiahua Che and Chung, {Kim Sau} and Xue Qiao",
note = "Funding Information: We thank Pranab Bardhan, Pohan Fang, Maitreesh Ghatak, Lawrence Lau, Melody Lo, Chia‐hui Lu, Vai‐lam Mui, Gerard Roland, Michael Song, Mathias Thoenig, and audience at various seminars and conferences for helpful comments. Danni Chen and Yunyun Lv provided excellent research assistance. Che, Chung, and Qiao are co‐first authors. The work described in this article is supported by grants from the NSFC (71473141), from the RGC of HKSAR (GRF14514416), and from HKBU (RC‐IG‐FNRA/17‐18/01). All errors are ours. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} (2021) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association",
year = "2021",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1111/iere.12523",
language = "English",
volume = "62",
pages = "1513--1535",
journal = "International Economic Review",
issn = "0020-6598",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",
number = "4",
}