Career Concerns, Beijing Style

Jiahua Che; Kim Sau Chung; Xue Qiao

doi:10.1111/iere.12523

Career Concerns, Beijing Style

Jiahua Che, Kim Sau Chung^*, Xue Qiao

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The China model is increasingly viewed by developing countries as a viable alternative to democracy. China's allegedly merit-based promotion system is lauded as a secret ingredient of the China model. However, once being promoted to the top, Chinese leaders are as unconstrained as other autocrats. If there are fundamental reasons why other autocrats cannot commit to such a promotion system, why are Chinese leaders any different? We provide a unified theory that accommodates both China and other autocracies by postulating that they coordinate on different equilibria. Both the presence and the absence of political career concerns can arise in equilibrium.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1513-1535
Number of pages	23
Journal	International Economic Review
Volume	62
Issue number	4
Early online date	29 May 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12523
Publication status	Published - Nov 2021

Scopus Subject Areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/iere.12523

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title = "Career Concerns, Beijing Style",

abstract = "The China model is increasingly viewed by developing countries as a viable alternative to democracy. China's allegedly merit-based promotion system is lauded as a secret ingredient of the China model. However, once being promoted to the top, Chinese leaders are as unconstrained as other autocrats. If there are fundamental reasons why other autocrats cannot commit to such a promotion system, why are Chinese leaders any different? We provide a unified theory that accommodates both China and other autocracies by postulating that they coordinate on different equilibria. Both the presence and the absence of political career concerns can arise in equilibrium.",

author = "Jiahua Che and Chung, {Kim Sau} and Xue Qiao",

note = "Funding Information: We thank Pranab Bardhan, Pohan Fang, Maitreesh Ghatak, Lawrence Lau, Melody Lo, Chia‐hui Lu, Vai‐lam Mui, Gerard Roland, Michael Song, Mathias Thoenig, and audience at various seminars and conferences for helpful comments. Danni Chen and Yunyun Lv provided excellent research assistance. Che, Chung, and Qiao are co‐first authors. The work described in this article is supported by grants from the NSFC (71473141), from the RGC of HKSAR (GRF14514416), and from HKBU (RC‐IG‐FNRA/17‐18/01). All errors are ours. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} (2021) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association",

year = "2021",

month = nov,

doi = "10.1111/iere.12523",

language = "English",

volume = "62",

pages = "1513--1535",

journal = "International Economic Review",

issn = "0020-6598",

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AU - Chung, Kim Sau

AU - Qiao, Xue

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N2 - The China model is increasingly viewed by developing countries as a viable alternative to democracy. China's allegedly merit-based promotion system is lauded as a secret ingredient of the China model. However, once being promoted to the top, Chinese leaders are as unconstrained as other autocrats. If there are fundamental reasons why other autocrats cannot commit to such a promotion system, why are Chinese leaders any different? We provide a unified theory that accommodates both China and other autocracies by postulating that they coordinate on different equilibria. Both the presence and the absence of political career concerns can arise in equilibrium.

AB - The China model is increasingly viewed by developing countries as a viable alternative to democracy. China's allegedly merit-based promotion system is lauded as a secret ingredient of the China model. However, once being promoted to the top, Chinese leaders are as unconstrained as other autocrats. If there are fundamental reasons why other autocrats cannot commit to such a promotion system, why are Chinese leaders any different? We provide a unified theory that accommodates both China and other autocracies by postulating that they coordinate on different equilibria. Both the presence and the absence of political career concerns can arise in equilibrium.

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JO - International Economic Review

JF - International Economic Review

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Career Concerns, Beijing Style

Abstract

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