Building trust in online auction markets through an economic incentive mechanism

Sulin Ba*, Andrew B. Whinston, Han Zhang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

229 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Millions of dollars change hands daily through online auction markets. However, fraud has been on the rise in these markets. Using a game theoretic approach, we propose a design of an economic incentive mechanism, the trusted third party (TTP), to serve the online auction communities. The proposed model addresses both the economic and technological aspects of online auction transactions by assigning a digital certificate to each participant. Thus, each participant's identity as well as his or her reputation can be established by other market participants. The analytical results demonstrate that when online transactions take place with the assistance of digital certificates issued by a TTP, the most utilitarian course of action for a market participant is to behave honestly.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)273-286
Number of pages14
JournalDecision Support Systems
Volume35
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2003

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Management Information Systems
  • Information Systems
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Information Systems and Management

User-Defined Keywords

  • Certification authority
  • Digital certificate
  • Electronic commerce
  • Electronic markets
  • Game theory
  • Online auction
  • Trust
  • Trusted third party

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