Abstract
While many philosophers of religion are familiar with the reconciliation of
grace and freedom known as Molinism, fewer by far are familiar with that
position initially developed by Molina’s erstwhile rival, Domingo Banez (i.e.,
Banezianism). My aim is to clarify a serious problem for the Banezian: how
the Banezian can avoid the apparent conflict between a strong notion of freedom and apparently compatibilist conclusions. The most prominent attempt
to defend Banezianism against compatibilism was (in)famously endorsed
by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Even if it were true that freedom does not
require alternative possibilities, Banezians have a grounding problem.
grace and freedom known as Molinism, fewer by far are familiar with that
position initially developed by Molina’s erstwhile rival, Domingo Banez (i.e.,
Banezianism). My aim is to clarify a serious problem for the Banezian: how
the Banezian can avoid the apparent conflict between a strong notion of freedom and apparently compatibilist conclusions. The most prominent attempt
to defend Banezianism against compatibilism was (in)famously endorsed
by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Even if it were true that freedom does not
require alternative possibilities, Banezians have a grounding problem.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 91-112 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Faith and Philosophy |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2021 |
Scopus Subject Areas
- Religious studies
- Philosophy