Arguments Against Substance Dualism Transformed Into Arguments Against Our Being Composite Physical Objects

Andrew Brenner

Arguments Against Substance Dualism Transformed Into Arguments Against Our Being Composite Physical Objects

Andrew Brenner^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Academy of Chinese, History, Religion and Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to conference › Conference paper

Abstract

I argue that the main arguments against substance dualism (the view that we are each an immaterial soul) can be transformed into arguments against our being composite physical objects (e.g., brains, organisms). I conclude with reflections on the question: what exactly is the difference between our being immaterial souls and our being composite physical objects?

Original language	English
Publication status	Published - 5 Nov 2020
Event	Seminar in the Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University (with Hong Kong University and National University of Singapore) - Lingnan University, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China Duration: 1 Nov 2020 → …

Seminar

Seminar	Seminar in the Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University (with Hong Kong University and National University of Singapore)
Country/Territory	Hong Kong, China
City	Hong Kong
Period	1/11/20 → …

Cite this

@conference{5cbf6ba47f104fc0bda61cc5c1892437,

title = "Arguments Against Substance Dualism Transformed Into Arguments Against Our Being Composite Physical Objects",

abstract = "I argue that the main arguments against substance dualism (the view that we are each an immaterial soul) can be transformed into arguments against our being composite physical objects (e.g., brains, organisms). I conclude with reflections on the question: what exactly is the difference between our being immaterial souls and our being composite physical objects? ",

author = "Andrew Brenner",

year = "2020",

month = nov,

day = "5",

language = "English",

note = "Seminar in the Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University (with Hong Kong University and National University of Singapore) ; Conference date: 01-11-2020",

}

Arguments Against Substance Dualism Transformed Into Arguments Against Our Being Composite Physical Objects. / Brenner, Andrew.
2020. Paper presented at Seminar in the Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University (with Hong Kong University and National University of Singapore), Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China.

Research output: Contribution to conference › Conference paper

TY - CONF

T1 - Arguments Against Substance Dualism Transformed Into Arguments Against Our Being Composite Physical Objects

AU - Brenner, Andrew

PY - 2020/11/5

Y1 - 2020/11/5

N2 - I argue that the main arguments against substance dualism (the view that we are each an immaterial soul) can be transformed into arguments against our being composite physical objects (e.g., brains, organisms). I conclude with reflections on the question: what exactly is the difference between our being immaterial souls and our being composite physical objects?

AB - I argue that the main arguments against substance dualism (the view that we are each an immaterial soul) can be transformed into arguments against our being composite physical objects (e.g., brains, organisms). I conclude with reflections on the question: what exactly is the difference between our being immaterial souls and our being composite physical objects?

UR - https://www.ln.edu.hk/philoso/Events/2020-21-seminar-series

M3 - Conference paper

T2 - Seminar in the Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University (with Hong Kong University and National University of Singapore)

Y2 - 1 November 2020

ER -

Arguments Against Substance Dualism Transformed Into Arguments Against Our Being Composite Physical Objects

Abstract

Seminar

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