Abstract
The paper presents a noncooperative stochastic differential game played by an infinite number of overlapping generations of players. ' The number and types of players in future generations are uncertain and the state dynamics are given by a stochastic differential equation. A Markovian Nash equilibrium is characterized by a verification theorem of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Belhnan type. A resource extraction game is offered as an illustration.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 69-74 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Journal | Automatica |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2005 |
| Externally published | Yes |
User-Defined Keywords
- Infinite time horizon
- Overlapping generations
- Stochastic differential game