Abstract
Consistent with the notions of growth-induced and disciplinary-induced CEO turnover, we find that the probability of CEO dismissal in the US and China is significantly higher for firms with better growth prospects or poorer past performance. Relative to the US, Chinese firms display a stronger incentive to replace their CEOs when better growth opportunities arise. We find weaker evidence for both growth- and disciplinary-induced CEO dismissal for Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Original language | English |
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Article number | 101401 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | Pacific Basin Finance Journal |
Volume | 63 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Oct 2020 |
Scopus Subject Areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
User-Defined Keywords
- Firm growth
- Life-cycle
- Managerial turnover
- State-owned enterprises