A Renewable Resource Extraction Game with Uncertain Future Payoff Structures

David W. K. Yeung*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in book/report/conference proceedingChapter


An essential characteristic of time -- and hence decision making over time -- is that, though the individual may, through the expenditure of resources, gather past and present information, the future is inherently unknown and therefore (in the mathematical sense) uncertain. In renewable resouce extraction, often the horizon approaches infinity and future payoffs are uncertain. In this paper, we develop a resouce extraction game model in which the future payoffs are not known with certainty and the evolution of the resource stock dynamics is stochastic. In particular, stochasticity in future payoff structures is modeled as a steady braching process. The introduction of this additional stochastic element offers a fruitful alternative to modeling infinite-horizon game situations under uncertainty. A (feedback) Nash equilibrium is solved for the game.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAgent-Based Approaches in Economic and Social Complex Systems
EditorsAkira Namatame, Takao Terano, Koichi Kurumatani
Place of PublicationAmsterdam
PublisherIOS Press
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)9781586032258, 1586032259
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2002
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
ISSN (Print)0922-6389


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