Abstract
空名所承诺的指称对象事实上不存在,有些科学上的理论字词也是空名。空名既无所指,又可如何解释其语意? 本文以科学名词为例,论证两种常见空名理论假装论与创造论皆有困难,提出全新语意函数「反事实指称」,作为第三种理论进路,务求在不增加本体承诺的情况下适切地限制语意,克服语意与本体的两难局面。前两种理论皆导向科学非实在论,新理论却与科学实在论相容,故为语言与实在关系提供更多可能之讨论方向,是其另一吸引之处。
An empty name is a name that does not have a referent as it depicts. Intuitively,empty names are intelligible and distinct in meaning even
though they all do not refer. Using theoretical terms in scientific discourse as examples,this paper introduces pretence and object theories as two major approaches to the semantics of empty name and argues that neither is satisfactory. A third approach coined the Counterfactual Reference Theory is motivated to solve the tension between semantics and ontology. It then discusses implications of this issue on scientific realism versus scientific antirealism.
An empty name is a name that does not have a referent as it depicts. Intuitively,empty names are intelligible and distinct in meaning even
though they all do not refer. Using theoretical terms in scientific discourse as examples,this paper introduces pretence and object theories as two major approaches to the semantics of empty name and argues that neither is satisfactory. A third approach coined the Counterfactual Reference Theory is motivated to solve the tension between semantics and ontology. It then discusses implications of this issue on scientific realism versus scientific antirealism.
Translated title of the contribution | Two Approaches to Empty Names: An Analysis of Scientific Theoretical Terms |
---|---|
Original language | Chinese (Simplified) |
Pages (from-to) | 14-19 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | 自然辩证法研究 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Feb 2018 |
User-Defined Keywords
- 空名
- 指称
- 假装论
- 创造论
- 社会现实的建构